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Abstract 
The ‘no’ vote in the Irish referendum of June 2008 on the Lisbon Treaty – reversed in October 
2009 – threw the European Union into crisis. Yet it reflected a familiar pattern of popular 
rejection of initiatives on European integration. This article provides an overview of such 
referendums in western Europe (unfortunately, the author lacks the linguistic competence to 
cover most post-2004 member states). It is evident that while mainstream trade unions (or at 
least their leaders) have usually endorsed the integration process, in most countries where 
referendums have been held their members have voted otherwise. Such rejection has often 
been based on ‘progressive’ rather than ‘reactionary’ grounds. Popular attitudes are 
malleable, but it requires a major strategic re-orientation if unions are to reconnect with their 
members in order to build a popular movement for a genuinely social Europe 
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Trade Unions and ‘Europe’: Are the  
Members out of Step? 
 
1. Introduction 
I was at a trade union seminar in Germany in June 2008 when news came through of 
the Irish ‘no’ to the Lisbon ‘Reform’ Treaty. Reactions combined incredulity and 
exasperation: incredulity that voters who had benefited economically from European 
Union (EU)1 membership should reject the next stage in the integration process, 
exasperation that a country with under 1% of total EU population could block 
ratification of a Treaty which would incorporate the unions’ cherished Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
But were the Irish voters the surrogate voice of popular opinion in Europe more 
generally? Writing a few years earlier, Kaufmann (2003) argued that the use of 
referendums had become the norm for accession decisions – all countries intending 
to join the EU in 1994, and with the exception of Cyprus all new entrants in 2004 – 
and was apparently becoming so for Treaty revisions. In almost all cases, the use of 
the referendum was optional and constitutionally only advisory (though in practice a 
negative popular vote could not readily be disregarded). Only in Ireland (following a 
Supreme Court judgment in 1987 that significant changes to national sovereignty 
must be approved by popular vote), and in Denmark in the absence of a five-sixths 
parliamentary majority, was a referendum constitutionally required. Elsewhere, 
governments tended to resort to referendums for tactical or strategic reasons: to win 
public legitimacy for a potentially contentious decision; to neutralise dissent within 
their own parties; to exploit divisions within the opposition (a reason for 
Mitterrand’s Maastricht referendum); or to strengthen their hand in bargaining 
accession terms or safeguards in Treaty revisions (Christin and Hug 2002; Closa 
                                                        
1 Throughout this article I use, for simplicity, the title EU, though this has applied only since 1993. 
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2007). And once the precedent was established, governments would find it hard to 
avoid future referendums on EU issues: the process would become ‘politically 
obligatory’ (Morel 2007). 
Such expectations were dashed by the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes on the 
Constitutional Treaty (or Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, TCE) in 2005. 
Six of the seven other scheduled national votes were abandoned. Neither Bulgaria 
nor Romania held referendums before accession in 2007; and the Irish citizens alone 
were to vote on the Lisbon Reform Treaty, some 90% of which overlapped with the 
TCE. EU referendums were no longer ‘politically obligatory’ but had become 
politically dangerous. 
This article has three main sections. First, I give a brief overview of the literature on 
the referendum experience in Europe and on the problematic concept of 
‘euroscepticism’. Second, I consider in more detail most of the key recent 
referendums, and trade union involvement in particular. Partly because of the limits 
of my own linguistic capacities, I focus on western Europe. Third, in conclusion and 
again briefly, I address the paradox that mainstream unions in Europe have long 
been among the most reliable supporters of EU integration, whereas their 
constituents have been among the most sceptical or hostile. What might a 
progressive trade union position towards European integration look like? 
 
2. Referendums on European Integration 
Since the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 – the first revision of the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome – there have been some 40 national referendums on issues related to EU 
accession, association or Treaty revision.2 As Table 1 indicates, there have been many 
cases when the popular vote has gone against integration proposals. Most notably, 
the Norwegian electorate (with an exceptionally high turnout) rejected accession in 
                                                        
2 Roberts-Thomson (2001) lists 7 EU-related referendums before the SEA, and also includes a 
referendum in Italy on 18 June 1989 to endorse the powers of MEPs. 
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1994, as it had done previously in 1972. The Swiss referendum on membership of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992, widely seen as a precursor to EU 
membership, resulted in a hair’s-breadth ‘no’ vote. In consequence Liechtenstein, 
economically tied to Switzerland, had to renegotiate the terms of its own EEA 
membership and hold a second referendum. Thereafter Switzerland has negotiated 
bilateral agreements with the EU/EEA, approved in the four referendums to which 
they have been submitted (though a referendum proposal for EU accession in 2001, 
not supported by the main political parties, was heavily defeated). 
Switzerland is an exceptional case, and unfortunately I do not have space to discuss 
this in any detail.3 A referendum can be initiated on any legislative issue by the 
signatures of (according to context) 50,000 or 100,000 citizens, and roughly ten are 
normally held each year; this provides trade unions, which can mobilise both 
signatures and voting, with an important political resource. They played a key role in 
the referendum of September 2005 on free movement of labour from the new 
member states. Both main confederations (SGB/USS and Travail.Suisse) demanded 
legislative measures to protect wages against ‘social dumping’ as the price for their 
support in the referendum, as they did again in February 2009 in relation to workers 
from Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 I am grateful to Roland Erne for information about the Swiss case. For more details see Church 
2003; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Marquis 2004; Sciarini and Listhaug 1997; Theiler 2004. 
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Table 1: EU Referendums since the SEA 
Country Issue Date Yes % Turnout % 
DK SEA 26.2.86 56 75 
IE SEA 26.5.87 70 44 
DK Maastricht 2.6.92 49 83 
IE Maastricht 18.6.92 69 57 
FR Maastricht 20.9.92 51 70 
CH EEA 6.12.92 49.7 78 
LI EEA 13.12.92 56 87 
DK Maastricht 18.5.93 57 87 
AT Accession 12.6.94 67 82 
FI Accession 16.10.94 57 71 
SE Accession 13.11.94 52 83 
Åland * Accession 20.11.94 74 49 
NO Accession 28.11.94 48 89 
LI EEA/CH 9.4.95 56 82 
CH Accession 8.6.97 26 35 
IE Amsterdam 22.5.98 62 56 
DK Amsterdam 28.5.98 55 76 
CH Bilateral agreement 21.5.00 67 48 
DK EMU 28.9.00 47 88 
CH Accession  4.3.01  23 55 
IE Nice 7.6.01 46 35 
IE Nice 19.10.02 63 49 
MT Accession 8.3.03 54 91 
SI Accession 23.3.03 90 60 
HU Accession   12.4.03 84 46 
LT Accession 10-11.5.03 90 63 
SK Accession 16-17.5.03 92 52 
PL Accession 7-8.6.03 78 59 
CZ Accession 13-14.6.03 77 55 
EE Accession 14.9.03 67 64 
SE EMU 14.9.03 44 81 
LV Accession 20.9.03 67 73 
ES Constitution 20.2.05 77 42 
FR Constitution 29.5.05 45 70 
NL Constitution 1.6.05 38 62 
CH Schengen 5.6.05 55 57 
LU Constitution 10.7.05 57 88 
CH Free movement 25.9.05 56 55 
CH Aid to NMSs 26.11.06 53 45 
IE Lisbon 12.6.08 47 53 
CH Free movement 8.2.09 60 51 
IE Lisbon 2.10.09 67 59 
* The Åland Islands are a semi-autonomous Swedish-speaking province of Finland. Having supported 
accession only narrowly (52%) in the general Finnish referendum in October 1994, its citizens voted 
separately in November following the Swedish referendum and endorsed accession by a large majority. 
Source: various, including Kaufmann 2003 and national statistical reports. There is cross-national variation in 
whether blank and spoiled ballots are included in the turnout figure, and hence whether the ‘yes’ percentage 
refers to all valid ballots or is reduced by the non-valid quotient. This rarely makes a difference of more than 
one percentage point. 
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All nine accession referendums in 2003 were successful, though in Malta – where the 
opposition Labour Party campaigned against – the margin was narrow (Cini 2003). 
Referendums on Treaty revisions have proved more unpredictable in their outcomes. 
The Danes narrowly rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a vote reversed the 
following year after the Edinburgh Agreement offered concessions to Danish 
concerns; while Mitterrand’s opportunistic decision to hold a referendum in France 
almost backfired (Criddle 1993). In 2001 the Irish rejected the Nice Treaty, a vote 
reversed the following year. Both the Danish (2000) and Swedish (2003) electorates 
have rejected the single currency. Thus the French and Dutch voters in 2005 followed 
a well-worn path, as did the Irish in 2008. 
European integration has proved to be, in a phrase coined by Maor and Smith (1993), 
a ‘maverick issue’. For many observers, underlying EU-related referendums is a 
‘second-order’ agenda, based ‘on short-term, national, rather than on long-term, 
European, considerations’ (Franklin et al. 1994: 470). Voters, according to this 
argument, are less concerned with the European question actually posed in the 
referendum than with the performance of the national government. In particular, 
those who normally support the governing party (or parties) may vote ‘no’ in the 
knowledge that this will not result in the victory of the opposition, as would happen 
in a normal national election. 
‘Second-order’ effects are particularly likely to have applied in the case of recent 
Treaty revisions. The TCE was a 474-page document (in its English version) and was 
unlikely to have been read in its entirety by significant numbers of voters. In 
November 2004, one-third of EU citizens had not even heard of the TCE, and of those 
who had – and claimed broadly to understand its contents – many were misinformed 
(Eurobarometer 2005a). The Lisbon Treaty was shorter (271 pages) but was widely 
seen as intentionally impenetrable, since much of its content involved amendments 
to the existing Treaties which could be interpreted only though detailed cross-
referencing; in effect it was an even more complex version of the TCE.  
The balance between ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ responses seems to vary both 
within and between countries. Not surprisingly, knowledge of the content of Treaty 
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revisions correlates with education – though even those with the highest educational 
levels are frequently misinformed (Eurobarometer 2005a; Hobolt 2007). And the 
political salience of the EU varies cross-nationally: ‘whereas European integration is 
a highly politicized and debated issue in some countries, it remains a peripheral 
topic in others’ (Hobolt 2006a: 155). 
Particularly where background knowledge is limited, referendum campaigns 
themselves may be of critical importance in structuring perceptions and in framing 
the questions at issue. The success of opposing organisations and parties in defining 
what are the key policy issues can determine the referendum outcome, but successful 
definition and redefinition strategies can prove volatile, one reason for the 
considerable swings in public opinion during many of the campaigns (de Vreese 
2007; Marsh 2007). And redefinition of the choices helps explain those occasions 
when the outcome shifts substantially between referendums on what is formally 
virtually the same question. 
It is common to treat ‘no’ votes in EU referendums as an expression of 
euroscepticism. This can be somewhat tautological: opposing accession, EMU entry 
or Treaty revision is both consequence, and an element in the definition, of 
euroscepticism. Quite apart from the linguistically questionable conflation of 
euroscepticism (literally, doubts about European integration or particular proposals 
to achieve it) and europhobia (hostility to the whole idea), this is also problematic in 
implying that there is a single dynamic underlying such opposition, regardless of 
time and place. 
Much recent literature has been critical of such assumptions. ‘No coherent theory 
exists that details what euroscepticism is, or why, when and how it occurs and 
develops’ (Sørensen 2008: 6). According to George (2000: 15) one may identify a 
continuum ‘from having doubts about the form that integration is taking, to having 
doubts about the benefits and advisability of further European integration, to 
hostility to the whole enterprise’. To some extent this connects with the distinction 
proposed by Lubbers and Scheepers between ‘political’ and ‘instrumental’ 
euroscepticism, the former involving opposition to ceding national sovereignty to 
Richard Hyman 
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European institutions, the latter based on a cost-benefit calculus of the outcomes of 
EU (or eurozone) membership. Likewise, Taggart (1998: 366) distinguishes between 
‘contingent or qualified opposition’ and ‘outright and unqualified opposition to the 
process of European integration’. 
Recently, Sørensen (2008: 8) has suggested a classification based on four broad types 
of euroscepticism. The first two, ‘economic’ and ‘sovereignty-based’, match the 
Lubbers and Scheepers schema. But to these she adds ‘democratic euroscepticism’, 
based on a perception that EU decision-making is remote from popular 
accountability and control; and an objection to the specific political content of EU 
policies. In particular, this fourth type tends to focus on social policy, based on 
perceptions that the dominant approach within the EU involves either too much or 
too little ‘Social Europe’ (the latter, she assumes, being currently the main basis of 
criticism). Contrasting three western member states, she suggests that euroscepticism 
in Denmark is sovereignty-based and to some extent democratic; in France, primarily 
social, but in part economic and democratic; in the UK, sovereignty-based and partly 
economic. 
These distinctions are of major importance in making sense of the referendum 
outcomes, and the trade union role in the process, which are the subject of the 
remainder of this article. 
 
3. Trade Unions and European Referendums 
In this central section I focus mainly on the referendums of 2005 and 2008, but 
against a longer historical background and wider geographical span. Organising the 
material in roughly historical sequence, I start with an overview of the Nordic 
member states, and in particular the 1994 accession referendums – with a brief 
examination of that in Austria – and the Danish and Swedish euro referendums. 
Then I consider the four TCE referendums in 2005 (in the French case, against the 
background of the previous referendum on Maastricht) and the Irish referendum on 
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Lisbon (also against the background of several earlier referendums). I end by 
mentioning the British case, in particular the debates on the euro and the non-
existent referendums on the TCE and Lisbon, with some reference to other ‘non-
referendums’. 
 
Denmark and Norway: From Accession Negotiations to Maastricht 
The Nordic countries have been described as ‘reluctant Europeans’, suspicious of the 
risks of EU membership in terms both of national economic interests and the viability 
of their distinctive social models (Miljan 1977). In general the official trade union 
organisations have assessed the economic benefits of integration as outweighing the 
risks, but have not necessarily convinced their memberships. As Archer (2000: 105) 
has concluded in an overview of the Nordic region, 'trade union leadership has been 
positive, but with some reservations, and has often found the membership hostile'. 
Denmark joined the EU in 1973, and has held six referendums on EU-related issues, 
more than any other member state except Ireland. In addition the Danish territory of 
Greenland, having obtained home rule in 1979, voted (with a majority of 53%) in a 
referendum three years later to withdraw from the EU – the only secession to date. In 
the view of Franklin (2002: 752), the Danes ‘have by far the best developed views on 
European integration of any voters in the European Union’. This also means that, in 
contrast to many national trade union movements, European issues cannot be 
delegated to EU ‘experts’; as one union official told me, his area’s delegate 
conferences are usually quiet until the EU is mentioned, when 20 members will be on 
their feet wanting to speak. 
The accession negotiations were concluded under a Socialdemokraterne minority 
government, which stressed the economic advantages of membership, and the LO 
leadership campaigned strongly in favour. However, two major unions (SiD and 
Metall) were opposed, and a special LO congress endorsed accession by a relatively 
narrow majority (524-406) (Haahr 1993: 178). In the referendum there was significant 
Richard Hyman 
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opposition on the left, and though the result was a 63% ‘yes’ vote, this primarily 
reflected solid support by right-wing voters (Archer 2000; Svensson 2002). Left-wing 
criticism persisted after accession, and the Socialdemokraterne, now in opposition, 
were divided over the SEA; the party leadership offered general support but the 
Parliamentary group decided to oppose. LO was again split, and agreed to adopt no 
formal position on the referendum (Haahr 1993: 207-10); the SEA was eventually 
endorsed by a 56% vote, again based mainly on solid support from right-wing 
parties. 
Denmark was one of three countries to hold a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty 
and the only one to vote against, despite a large majority in favour in the preceding 
parliamentary vote. The Treaty was endorsed by the leaders of the Socialdemokraterne 
and the LO, the latter citing in particular the ‘social chapter’ as a reason for support. 
The opposition was led by the left-wing Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF, Socialist People’s 
Party) together with two smaller right-wing parties. In the event, members of SF 
voted solidly against, as did almost two-thirds of Social Democratic supporters, 
hence the majority of trade union members, contributing to a ‘no’ majority of just 
under 51%. In the political turmoil which followed, a ‘national compromise’ was 
reached setting the terms on which the SF would end its opposition, and these in 
turn were accepted by other EU members in the Edinburgh Agreement. In the 
second referendum the Treaty was accepted, but the great majority of SF supporters, 
and almost half the Social Democrats, still voted ‘no’, with manual workers and 
public sector employees most strongly opposed (Christiansen 1992; Svensson, 1994 
and 2002; Worre 1995). At the next referendum, on the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998, 
much of the SF leadership moved back to the stance of their rank-and-file and joined 
the ‘no’ campaign. However LO mounted a well resourced campaign in favour of the 
Treaty, on the theme of Fagligt Europa (a trade union Europe) (Petersen 1997) This 
time the ‘yes’ majority was comfortable, but somewhat smaller than in the second 
Maastricht vote; the split among social democrats matched the national result 
(Petersen 1998). 
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In Norway, much of the background to the accession referendum was similar to that 
in Denmark, but the outcome was different – partly because of the country’s larger 
geographical spread and the stronger relative weight of the more remote regions, 
which were strongly anti-EU. In advance of the 1972 referendum, the leaderships of 
both Det Norske Arbeiterparti (Labour Party, DNA) and the LO strongly supported EU 
membership. At a special LO congress in June 1972, this position was 
overwhelmingly endorsed, and the confederation ‘devot[ed] huge resources to a 
campaign in favour of… membership’ (Dølvik and Stokland 1992: 165). Yet there was 
‘substantial grassroots EU opposition’, contributing significantly to the 53.5% ‘no’ 
vote. ‘The results of the referendum came as a substantial shock to the LO leadership. 
A clear majority of LO members chose to ignore the LO leadership and voted to 
oppose membership (Geyer 1997: 67-8). 
The outcome ‘left the unions seriously split’, and LO subsequently ‘follow[ed] a very 
cautious strategy’ (Dølvik and Stokland 1992: 165). When DNA in the mid-1980s 
revived the accession issue, the LO leadership refused to adopt a firm position; and 
when the EEA agreement was drafted, in effect as a half-way house to EU 
membership, it published a set of 15 conditions for its support. In June 1990 the 
leadership announced that these conditions had been satisfied, but ‘opinion of LO 
members continued to be skeptical’ (Geyer 1997: 68). 
 
Enlargement 1995 
The previous divisions were well to the fore when the three main Nordic countries 
outside the EU, together with Austria, applied for membership. The four 
referendums were deliberately sequenced with the aim of creating a bandwagon 
effect, with the first votes held in the countries with strongest popular support. But 
though voting after the other three countries had approved accession, the Norwegian 
electorate again rejected membership, though by an even narrower majority on a 
higher turnout than in 1972. 
Richard Hyman 
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On paper the issues were more restricted than before, since by entering the EEA – 
which was not subject to a referendum – Norway had adopted much of the EU 
acquis. But key problems related to fisheries and agriculture, again spurring a 
powerful interest-based opposition. The new application for membership had been 
initiated by a DNA government, and much of the LO leadership was sympathetic, 
but a special LO congress voted 156-149 against. The Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist 
Left Party) campaigned strongly against membership, as did an organised anti-EU 
section of DNA (Sciarini and Listhaug 1997). In the referendum itself, cross-cutting 
an urban/rural split, manual workers strongly supported the ‘no’ side, and there was 
also higher opposition among women than men, partly because EU membership was 
seen as a threat to the Norwegian welfare state (Sogner and Archer 1995; Wyller 
1996). 
In Sweden the vote was similarly close, but in the other direction. Before the 1990s, 
EU membership had been generally ruled out as inconsistent both with Swedish 
neutrality and with its highly developed welfare state. But the end of the cold war 
and the escalating economic problems led to membership of the EEA in order to 
participate in the European single market (Archer 2000). As in Norway, EU accession 
was then initiated by a social-democratic government, but with considerable internal 
opposition: a special congress of the Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (SAP) in June 
1994 supported EU membership by 232-103 (Jahn et al. 1998: 63). Leaders of LO – and 
also the white-collar confederation TCO – in general supported EU membership; but 
there were major internal divisions, and officially LO took a neutral position. In the 
referendum, ‘grass-roots union members, especially in the blue-collared sector, 
provided one of the main sources of opposition’ (Archer 2000: 104). SAP supporters 
split 50:50 between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (Johansson and Raunio 2001: 236) 
Finland registered the highest pro-EU vote of the Nordic accession countries, in part 
reflecting a high degree of pro-EU consensus on the left. In contrast to Sweden, 
supporters of the Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (social democrats) voted 3:1 in favour 
of accession, and those of the Vihreä liitto (Greens), which made no formal 
recommendation, did so by a small majority (while the Swedish Greens opposed 
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accession), and the left-wing Vasemmistoliitto also took no formal position (unlike its 
anti-accession Swedish counterpart), though its members voted 3:1 against 
(Johansson and Raunio 2001). This meant that support for EU membership was far 
less problematic for the Finnish trade unions than elsewhere in Scandinavia. A 
crucial background factor was that throughout the cold war, Finnish politics was 
dominated by the need for economic and political coexistence with the neighbouring 
Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet empire disrupted Finland’s trade with the 
east, creating an urgent need for stronger economic links with the west, and also 
made EU membership a protection against future conflicts with an unstable Russian 
neighbour (Arter 1995). ‘Most trade unions had a positive attitude towards EU 
membership and may have contributed to the successful persuasion of the uncertain 
Social Democrats’ (Suksi 1996: 60). 
Austria was the first of the 1995 accession countries to hold its referendum, and 
registered the largest majority (two-thirds). Many of the contentious issues that 
emerged on the left in Scandinavia were also salient here, but partly because of 
stronger discipline in the party (SPÖ) and union (ÖGB) figured less prominently in 
the campaign. The ‘very marked and stable elite consensus on the desirability of EU 
membership’ (Kaiser 1995: 414) was however a late construction. The initial demand 
for accession came from the employers’ side and was endorsed by the christian-
democratic ÖVP. The SPÖ had long opposed EU membership as incompatible with 
Austrian neutrality; but attitudes changed in the mid-1980s, and in 1989 the party 
leadership endorsed accession with minimal internal opposition (Kaiser 1995: 412). 
Within the ÖGB, reservations were at first stronger. At a special conference in July 
1988, nine conditions were set for accession, including guarantees for Austrian 
neutrality, the protection of Austria’s welfare model, and guarantees that the unions’ 
privileged role in national policy formulation would be extended to EU-level 
decision-making.4 But the reservations were rapidly sidelined – in part, perhaps, 
because of the leading role of the ÖGB president, Fritz Verzetnitsch, within the 
                                                        
4 This paragraph is based on my own archival research at the ÖGB but also draws on Müller 2009 
and Pelinka and Greiderer 1996. 
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ETUC (he was to become its president in 1993). In March 1989 the ÖGB signed a joint 
statement with the employers supporting accession, on condition that Austrian 
neutrality was preserved. The ÖGB congress in October 1991 was organized with a 
succession of outside speakers favouring accession, though the leadership 
emphasised ‘its fundamental position, that the goal of European integration must be 
the creation of a democratic and social Europe’. Speakers from the floor were 
however far more critical: most of the 1988 preconditions had been forgotten, the 
demand to sustain neutrality and national control of social policy was just 'a pious 
wish', union members in a number of sectors would be threatened by the single 
market. By the time of the referendum, the publicity material issued by the ÖGB was 
almost exclusively in favour of a ‘yes’ vote. As a senior official told me, there was a 
systematic process of propaganda leading up to the referendum campaign. All the 
structures of the ÖGB were expected to be opinion leaders, and hundreds of events 
were organized across the country. 
In the event, organised opposition was rather marginal. Among the political parties, 
the only significant opponents were Die Grünen and the far-right FPÖ, though for 
very different reasons (Pelinka and Greiderer 1996). In marked contrast to the 
Scandinavian countries, almost three-quarters of SPÖ voters supported the party 
line, whereas the ‘no’ vote among supporters of the two opposing parties proved less 
solid (Kaiser 1995: 414). 
 
The Euro: Denmark and Sweden 
EMU had not been a significant issue in the Austrian and Finnish referendums, and 
both countries were among the eleven member states to join the eurozone at the 
outset. In Sweden, as in Denmark – where EMU had been one of the contentious 
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questions in the Maastricht referendum, resulting in effect in allowing an opt-out5 – 
the question was to recur, in both cases ending with negative referendum votes. 
In Denmark the governing Socialdemokraterne initiated a referendum in 2000, with the 
backing of most political parties, even though popular support for the single 
currency was lower than in any member state apart from Britain (de Vreese and 
Semetko 2004: 706). The top leadership of LO also gave strong support (Marcussen 
and Zølner 2001: 387). As on previous occasions, the Socialdemokraterne – and the 
unions – were in practice divided; the members don’t trust us on European issues, a 
senior LO official told me after the referendum, adding: ‘and they shouldn’t’. Again 
the Socialistisk Folkeparti was opposed (as was the smaller right-wing Dansk 
Folkeparti). The opposition was generally regarded as managing a more effective 
campaign than the ‘yes’ camp, stressing the risk that Danish political autonomy 
would be submerged within the eurozone. The outcome was a somewhat larger ‘no’ 
vote than anticipated, over 53%; as in previous referendums, a slight majority of 
social democrats voted ‘no’ (Qvortrup 2001). 
In Sweden the SAP was also divided, though premier Göran Persson attempted to 
impose central discipline. The party agreed to support euro entry at a special 
conference in 2000, ‘albeit with a number of caveats’; two years later the national 
council decided that its conditions had been met (Widfeldt 2004: 506). The LO in 2000 
‘adopted a cautiously positive position’ (Widfeldt 2004: 507), setting conditions for 
macroeconomic management which the government could not easily accept. In fact 
LO was divided: the manufacturing unions Metall  and Industrifacket were strongly in 
favour of the euro, Handels and Transport were equally strongly opposed, with most 
other unions lukewarm; hence in April 2003 the LO decided not to take a formal line 
on the referendum (Aylott 2005; Berg 2003). Nevertheless its president Wanja 
Lundby-Wedin signalled her personal support, and signed a pro-euro declaration 
together with the heads of the two white-collar confederations and business leaders. 
‘The splits within and between the SAP and the LO meant that the major labour 
                                                        
5 The Swedish government claimed to have been accorded a similar opt-out to Denmark as part 
of its accession negotiations. 
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movement organisations could not present a united front in the campaign. Another 
factor, which alienated many working-class voters and SAP supporters, was the co-
operation with what were normally regarded as political “enemies”’ (Widfeldt 2004: 
509). In the event, the rejection of euro entry – by a margin of 12% – was far more 
decisive than anticipated. LO members voted almost two to one against, and TCO 
members were evenly divided. The majority of SAP supporters again voted ‘no’. 
 
4. The Four Referendums on the Constitutional Treaty 
Ten member states announced referendums on the TCE, with Sweden undecided at 
the time of the negative votes in France and the Netherlands. By then, Spain had 
already held its referendum, and Luxembourg decided to proceed despite the two 
rejections, but all other referendums were abandoned as the ratification of the TCE 
was put on hold. 
The ETUC strongly supported the TCE, despite explicit qualifications. It had 
campaigned vigorously for the Charter of Fundamental Rights to be given legal 
status within the new Treaty. When it appeared that this might be dropped, it 
warned that ‘governments must be aware of the risk of a strong reaction building up 
among the working peoples of Europe if the Constitution is unsatisfactory on social 
questions…. This could put trade union support for the Constitutional Treaty in 
jeopardy, with potential repercussions especially in countries planning to hold 
referendums’ (press release 10 June 2004). When this threat was averted, the TCE 
was endorsed by overwhelming majorities in the Steering Committee on 13 July 2004 
and the Executive Committee on 14 October 2004. Though arguing that ‘the 
Constitution must represent a base from which to promote the construction of more 
Social Europe’, the ETUC concluded that ‘support is the only pragmatic and realistic 
approach for trade unions’. But as a leading official later commented wryly, ‘not one 
affiliated organisation raised objections or concerns with regard to the ETUC 
approach to the Convention or the IGC. Once the process was finished, major and 
fundamental criticisms were voiced’ (Kowalsky 2006: 449). In the event, only the 
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French Force ouvrière (FO) voted against, while twelve affiliates including the British 
TUC, French Confédération générale du travail (CGT), Swedish Tjänstemännens 
Centralorganisation (TCO) and the Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses 
abstained.6  
 
Spain: No Contest? 
The TCE was endorsed by all major Spanish parties, including the governing 
socialists (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE). The only significant national party 
opposed was Izquierda Unida , which primarily comprised the former communist 
party, but had attracted under 5% of the popular vote in the previous national 
election. Both main trade unions, Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) and 
Comisiones Obreros (CC.OO.), campaigned for a ‘yes’ vote – though a left-wing 
fraction, sector crítico CC.OO., opposed the official line. 
The referendum endorsed the TCE by a massive 77% majority. However, turnout 
was only 42%, compared to a vote of over 70% normal in Spanish national elections 
(though in line with the turnout in the previous European elections). The result was 
widely interpreted as a sign of a lack of popular interest in, or comprehension of, the 
Constitutional Treaty. Nevertheless, in contrast to the three subsequent referendums, 
over 90% of PSOE supporters voting supported the TCE (Eurobarometer 2005b). 
 
France: Maastricht and the Constitutional Treaty 
In France, referendums are convened at the discretion of the president. The first-ever 
referendum on European integration was held in April 1972 in order to endorse the 
first wave of enlargement; this was supported by over two-thirds of French voters. 
Twenty years later, François Mitterrand called a referendum over Maastricht. Both 
                                                        
6 An interesting indication of a broader unease was the ‘trade union appeal in support of the TCE’, 
published by the Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) in collaboration with 
the ETUC secretariat a week before the French referendum. Only 16 of the 77 national affiliates 
signed up. 
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presidential decisions were widely viewed as opportunistic: Georges Pompidou in 
1972 ‘was seeking to assert his authority through an issue (European integration) 
assumed to have a unifying and mobilising potential, whilst simultaneously 
exposing the divisions among his political opponents…. All these preoccupations 
were Mitterrand’s in the spring of 1992’ (Criddle 1993: 228) – though the referendum 
could also be seen as asserting the viability of the Maastricht Treaty after the Danish 
rejection. On either count, the initiative backfired, with a bare majority of voters 
approving the Treaty. 
The campaign saw most mainstream politicians in the yes ‘camp’, though there were 
some rebels within the Parti socialiste (PS), and the main right-wing parties were 
more fundamentally divided. Both the Parti communiste (PCF) and the far-right Front 
national (FN) campaigned against. Among the unions, the Treaty was actively 
supported by the CFDT and opposed by the CGT. 
The referendum result provided a major basis for the ‘second-order’ voting thesis 
(Franklin et al. 1995). According to Moravcsik (1993: 52), ‘the rhetoric of opposition to 
(as well as support for) the Maastricht treaty had strikingly little to do with its 
specific provisions; on the contrary, like the decision to call a referendum itself, it 
reflected in large part the specific domestic political circumstances under which it 
took place’. Indeed, surveys indicated that 40% of ‘no’ voters were motivated by 
discontent with Mitterrand and the government, 30% by rejection of the whole 
political class (Criddle1993: 238). But in practice, ‘domestic’ and ‘European’ concerns 
are not easily disentangled. Both the government, and its critics on the left, presented 
monetary discipline, institutional reform and curbs on public spending as necessary 
responses to the single market and the future single currency (Milner 2000; Ross 
1998). Post-election analyses suggested that these considerations, rather than the 
xenophobia of the FN and some other opponents on the right, primarily contributed 
to the size of the ‘no’ vote, which ‘was working-class, with industrial and inner-city 
areas voting heavily against, notably areas of high unemployment’ (Criddle1993: 
235). As Moss argued (1998: 70), ‘this was not a nationalist vote but a class vote of 
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protest by those who associated sound money and the single currency with 
unemployment’. 
In 2005 the line-up of forces was very similar, though on this occasion – and 
doubtless one reason why Jacques Chirac called the referendum – the PS (whose 
members had voted almost 4:1 in favour of Maastricht) was far more deeply divided. 
Its deputy leader and former prime minister, Laurent Fabius, came out against the 
TCE. An internal party ballot resulted in 59% support for a ‘yes’, but the minority 
was sufficient to sustain an organised oppositional role (Ivaldi 2006: 51-2). Les Verts 
(Greens) also held an internal ballot, which resulted in a narrow ‘yes’ majority, and 
both factions campaigned on opposite sides. Smaller left-wing parties were actively 
opposed to the TCE, while a leading role was taken by the altermondialiste group 
ATTAC (Cassen 2005). 
As in 1992, the trade unions were divided.7 The CFDT was again a strong supporter, 
listing ‘ten good reasons to say yes’, and was joined by two smaller confederations. 
As noted above, the FO was the one ETUC affiliate to vote against the TCE at the 
executive meeting, and it insisted that it did not consider itself committed by the 
ETUC decision in favour, which it argued was procedurally incorrect. Its central 
objection was that the TCE entrenched a neoliberal policy regime destructive of 
employment rights and welfare provision. FO did not actually call on its members to 
vote ‘no’, since it was ‘confident of their astuteness and power of reasoning’ – but the 
message was clear. The position of the CGT was particularly interesting. As noted 
above, it abstained in the ETUC vote, perhaps restrained by its recent (1999) 
acceptance into the Confederation and the election of its international secretary, Joël 
Decaillon, to the ETUC secretariat in 2003. Its initial assessment of the TCE (May 
2004) was rather neutral, echoing both the positive and negative comments of the 
ETUC. In September there was still no clear verdict, and the confederal committee set 
up a working group to prepare a position paper. But at the national committee in 
February 2005 there was in effect a rank-and-file revolt – which the general secretary, 
Bernard Thibault, deplored as the creation of a minority of activists – committing the 
                                                        
7
 This paragraph is based on a variety of trade union documents available online. 
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CGT to campaign for rejection of the Treaty. The vote was in fact decisive: 81 to 18; 
the CGT returned to the position of opposition it had adopted in 1992. The most 
unambiguous trade union opposition came from the smaller left-wing Union 
syndicale Solidaires (SUD), which called for a vote against neoliberalism but for a 
different Europe. 
The popular verdict was decisive, a 55% ‘no’ vote on a high turnout. As in 1992 (and 
in negative outcomes in other countries), the ‘no’ vote was firmly rooted in the 
working class, indicating ‘a clear-cut class cleavage opposing the haves and the have-
nots in contemporary French society’ (Ivaldi 2006: 57). This included 56% of PS 
supporters, a dramatic change from 1992 (Ivaldi 2006; Marthaler 2005). Analysis of 
the campaign and the results identified two very different bases for rejection. 
Certainly one strong element in France was a xenophobic nationalism, exemplified 
by the FN. There was a perceived threat to jobs from enlargement in 2004 (on which 
none of the EU15 countries had held a referendum), exemplified by the ‘Polish 
plumber’ issue, and there were also strong reactions against possible Turkish 
accession. But conversely, there was a left-wing, pro-European ‘non’ (Brouard and 
Tiberj 2006; Milner 2006). As in 1992, the connection was made between deflation 
and deregulation at home and the policies being driven by the European 
Commission and symbolised by the Bolkestein services directive – against which the 
ETUC had organised a European demonstration on 21 March. This was ‘a vote 
against a particular Europe, an economically liberal Europe’ (Brouard and Tiberj 
2006: 266), and was as much (or more) a ‘retrospective performance evaluation’ 
(Ivaldi 2006: 59) as an assessment of the actual content of the TCE. 
 
The Dutch Rejection 
The Dutch referendum took place three days after the French and was even more 
decisive in its outcome, with a 62% ‘no’ vote. This was the more remarkable because 
whereas ‘in France there was opposition to the Constitutional Treaty from within the 
heart of the party system…, in the Dutch case there was little opposition to the 
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Treaty from the mainstream parties’ (Taggart 2006: 19). All three parties in the 
centre-right coalition supported the TCE, as did the opposition Labour Party (Partij 
van de Arbeid, PvdA) and the GroenLinks. As in France, the opposition was led by 
parties outside the political mainstream: on the left, by the Socialistische Partij (SP), 
and on the right, by a diverse array of nationalistic, religious and xenophobic parties 
and groups. 
The main Dutch trade union, the Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV), urged its 
members to vote ‘yes’: ‘the European Constitution is a step forward’. But FNV does 
not appear to have engaged actively in the campaign. 
Many of the key arguments in the campaign, on both left and right, mirrored those in 
France. But another theme was that the Netherlands, a small country, was losing its 
autonomy and cultural identity within an enlarged EU and was being sidelined by 
the larger member states, that it was paying too much to Brussels, that the euro had 
hit consumers’ pockets (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006; Harmsen 2005; Lubbers 2008). 
Since this was the first Dutch referendum in modern times, the government had no 
experience of such campaigns, and the ‘no’ campaigners appeared far more 
successful in taking the initiative and defining the agenda. The ‘no’ vote was far 
greater than expected, probably influenced by the result in France. PvdA supporters 
voted in the same proportions as the national pattern, and supporters of both main 
government parties also recorded ‘no’ majorities (Harmsen 2005: 12). 
 
Luxembourg: Too Close for Comfort 
Luxembourg was the one government to continue with its referendum after the dual 
rejections in France and the Netherlands, in part because it held the EU presidency in 
the first half of 2005 and wished to demonstrate that the TCE was not yet dead. 
Given the high degree of popular support for European integration – indeed the 
highest in any member state – a substantial majority was taken for granted; but 
though the result was positive the ‘yes’ vote of under 57% was ‘an embarrassment 
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for the Juncker government’ (Qvortrup 2006: 93) – particularly since the outcome 
could be seen in part as a simple vote of confidence in a popular prime minister, who 
threatened to resign if the vote was lost. 
Virtually all political parties – including the social-democratic Lëtzebuerger 
Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei (LSAP) – supported the TCE; of those represented in 
parliament, only the small right-wing Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (ADR) 
took a neutral stance, though with an obvious negative inclination. The far left, not 
represented in parliament, attacked the TCE as entrenching a neo-liberal regime 
(Hausemer 2005: 2), and an altermondialiste action committee played a substantial role 
in the opposition campaign (Dumont et al. 2007: 22-4). Public knowledge of the TCE 
was shown in surveys to be extremely limited. 
The two main trade union confederations, the socialist Onofhängege Gewerkschaftsbond 
Lëtzebuerg (OGB-L) and the christian-democratic Lëtzebuerger Chrëschtleche 
Gewerkschaftsbond (LCGB), both supported the TCE, though with significant 
differences in enthusiasm. The LCGB gave strong support, insisting that the Treaty 
involved no threat to social protections; the OGB-L was lukewarm. The resolution 
adopted by its national committee in March was headed: ‘yes, but…’, and stressed 
that the balance between market liberalisation and social rights fell short both of the 
demands of the ETUC and the content of the original draft Constitution presented by 
the European Convention. This gave a green light for those speaking on behalf of the 
union to emphasise the negative. 
The dominant message of the ‘no’ campaign was the threat to ‘social Europe’, 
including the expectation of job security. As in many other countries, manual 
workers voted 2:1 against and supporters of the LSAP split evenly between ‘yes’ and 
‘no’; while 85% of ‘no’ voters nevertheless considered membership of the EU ‘a good 
thing’. The most frequently cited reason for voting ‘no’ was the threat to jobs through 
offshoring (Dumont et al. 2007: 122, 127-8, 187). 
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5. Ireland: The Route to Lisbon 
As in a number of other member states, the trade unions in Ireland have shifted from 
a primarily anti-EU stance to support for further integration – though ironically, this 
change has coincided with declining support for the EU in popular referendums. 
Ireland joined the EU in 1973 together with Britain and Denmark, and is the only one 
of the trio to have entered the eurozone. The unions campaigned against accession, 
but the referendum in 1972 endorsed membership by a majority of 83%, and (unlike 
their British counterparts) they then engaged fully in the EU institutions. The Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) took no formal stance on the SEA, which was 
approved by 70%. On Maastricht, ‘from a directly opposed position in the 1972 
referendum to a non-specific position on the SEA, the ICTU finally evaluated EC 
membership and the prospects of further commitments positively in the 1992 
campaign’ (van Wijnbergen 1994: 186). Though some on the left opposed Maastricht 
as a threat to Irish neutrality, the debate was overshadowed by the abortion issue, 
with some on the left objecting to a restrictive protocol to the Treaty obtained by the 
Irish government while some anti-abortion groups objecting on diametrically 
opposite grounds. The outcome was a decisive 69% ‘yes’ vote. 
The vote on the Amsterdam Treaty took place the same day as that on the Northern 
Ireland agreement, a matter of some controversy. Notably, the rules of the game 
changed: new legislation prevented the government from using public funds to 
influence the result, and a High Court ruling required that both sides in the 
campaign should have equal access to airtime. As before, all mainstream political 
parties supported the Treaty; those opposing, the Greens, Sinn Féin and the Socialist 
Party, had between them only four seats in parliament (Gilland 1999). The main 
arguments for a ‘no’ vote centred on a perceived threat to Irish neutrality, the EU’s 
democratic deficit, and the subordination of social to economic policy. The ICTU 
backed the Treaty as embodying employment and social inclusion as policy priorities 
of the EU. After a low-key campaign the Treaty was comfortably approved, though 
by a significantly smaller majority than with Maastricht. 
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For the vote on the Nice Treaty – the first revision to the Treaty of Rome on which 
Ireland alone held a referendum – the political line-up was largely the same, and the 
campaign centred around the familiar themes, though EU enlargement added issues 
regarding Ireland’s increased contributions to the EU budget, the dilution of its 
influence on decision-making, and the opening of the labour market to eastern 
European workers. The ‘yes’ campaign was widely regarded as lacklustre and 
ineffective (Garry et al. 2005; Gilland 2002; Qvortrup and Taffe 2002). The arguments 
in favour of the Treaty were vague and inconsistent, reflecting internal dissent 
between and within the governing parties; effectively the ‘no’ camp set the agenda 
(Hayward 2002). Though the ICTU was strongly in favour (only one member of the 
executive voted against) it does not appear to have campaigned actively. There is 
evidence of complacency among supporters of the Treaty: in the most recent 
Eurobarometer survey, 75% supported Irish membership of the EU and 85% believed 
that Ireland had gained from membership (Qvortrup and Taffe 2002), and pre-
referendum polls showed a large yes majority. But the result was a 54% ‘no’ vote, on 
a very low turnout. Most assessments regarded the result as a reflection of lack of 
information and understanding of the Treaty – the main explanation given by both 
non-voters and ‘no’ voters. The slogan of the opponents of Nice, ‘if you don’t know, 
vote no’, seemed to prove effective. 
For the second referendum sixteen months later the ‘yes’ camp mounted a far more 
active campaign (Gilland 2003). For their part, the ICTU and its affiliates engaged far 
more vigorously, spelling out what were seen as the benefits for workers from the 
Treaty, countering the core arguments of its opponents, and denouncing ‘scare-
mongering about floods of immigrants from Eastern Europe taking Irish jobs after 
enlargement’ (ICTU press release, 16 October 2002). 
The outcome was a much higher turnout (though still just under 50%) and a clear 
‘yes’ majority. This seemed to refute ‘second-order’ theories (the Irish government 
was actually more popular at the time of the first referendum than the second) and 
suggested that vigorous campaigns increased the salience for voters of substantive 
‘first-order’ issues (Garry et al. 2005). 
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A referendum on the TCE, scheduled for the autumn of 2005, was abandoned after 
the French and Dutch results; and as noted above, Ireland was the only country to 
hold a popular vote on Lisbon. While the campaign was in many respects similar to 
those on the three previous Treaty revisions, there were two important changes. 
First, Irish opposition was informed by the ideas and arguments of the 2005 French 
campaign, to some extent cross-fertilised by involvement in the European Social 
Forum. Second, the industrial relations climate had been inflamed by a bitter 
confrontation at the end of 2005 between the main Irish union, SIPTU, and Irish 
Ferries, when the company unilaterally decided to re-flag its vessels and replace the 
existing crews by mainly Latvian agency workers (Dobbins 2005). There were close 
parallels with the Viking dispute following which the ECJ deemed strike action by 
Finnish unions to have breached EU law on freedom of establishment and of 
movement. 
One consequence was that the trade unions were far more divided than previously. 
Though the ICTU endorsed Lisbon, the vote in the executive was 14 to 5 with 8 
abstentions. The UK-based Unite (previously ATGWU), which had in previous 
referendums been the only union to advocate rejection, was on this occasion joined 
by the Technical, Engineering and Electrical Union (TEEU), both citing the recent ECJ 
judgments as reasons to vote ‘no’. Perhaps more importantly, SIPTU demanded a 
government commitment to legislate for stronger controls over agency workers and 
to protect trade union rights; when this was refused it made no recommendation to 
its members, widely seen as a tacit call to reject the Treaty. 
The referendum result, a 53% no vote, was widely predicted. ‘Voting was heavily 
class-correlated’ (Storey 2008: 77), with 74% of manual workers in the ‘no’ camp 
(Chari 2008). Assessments of the result have suggested that most of those voting ‘no’ 
did so on the basis of the perceived content of the Treaty, but for a multiplicity of 
often conflicting reasons (Holmes 2008). However, it was widely considered that 
workers’ rights were one important factor. In its own reaction, the ICTU insisted that 
in supporting enlargement at the time of the Nice referendums, it was not aware that 
the Irish labour market would be immediately opened to the new member states, and 
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was not consulted on this; a particular problem because Ireland had a small and 
‘virtually unregulated labour market’ (ICTU Briefing July 2008).  
As with the Nice Treaty, a second referendum reversed the popular verdict. At a 
meeting of the EU Council in December 2008, the government obtained a set of ‘legal 
guarantees’ aimed at addressing issues raised by the ‘no’ campaign. Ireland would 
not be subject to new rules concerning taxation, ‘family’ issues - such as abortion, 
euthanasia and gay marriage - and the traditional Irish state neutrality was 
protected. It was also agreed that every member state would retain a commissioner 
after the new Treaty took effect. The Irish ‘protocol’ would be added to the next EU 
accession Treaty. Perhaps more important than these concessions was the impact of 
the global economic crisis, which seemed to underline the vulnerability of an Ireland 
committed to ‘going it alone’. 
The ICTU executive again backed a ‘yes vote’, though agreeing that affiliates could 
adopt their own position in the campaign. On this occasion both Unite and TEEU 
maintained their opposition, emphasising ‘the lack of any progress in the critical area 
of workers’ rights’. However SIPTU now gave its backing to the Treaty, although 
expressing a series of reservations and also emphasising that concerns over the ECJ 
judgments had not been adequately addressed. In the event, the result was a two to 
one majority in favour of Lisbon, with the highest turnout on a European 
referendum in Ireland since the vote on accession in 1972. 
 
5. The British Referendum that Never Was (and Others) 
I have neither the need nor space to discuss in detail the position of the British 
unions, which is well documented. Britain joined the EU in 1973, under a 
Conservative government. After Labour was elected the following year, a 
referendum was held – the first and only time such a measure has been used in the 
UK – in June 1975, partly to resolve intense internal party conflict on the issue; the 
result was a two-to-one vote to remain in the EU. Majority trade union opinion, 
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which at times expressed conditional support for membership, had hardened into 
complete rejection, and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) campaigned for a ‘no’ 
vote. Its majority position remained hostile until the 1980s, when the ‘social 
dimension’ of the EU became far preferable to the market liberalism of the Thatcher 
government, and it has in general supported the subsequent Treaty revisions. 
The TUC general council overwhelmingly backed Maastricht and opposed calls for a 
referendum. Despite qualifications and internal divisions, it has supported EMU 
entry. Rank-and-file opinion has been far more negative: one 1999 survey found 61% 
of union members opposed to joining the euro, only 23% in favour (Mullen and 
Burkitt 2003: 333); another found a slightly lower negative opinion, but still 
substantial and higher than among the population as a whole (Mulhearn 2004: 296). 
A leftward switch in the leadership of two of the largest unions – Amicus in 2002, 
TGWU in 2003, now both amalgamated to form Unite – has resulted in a more 
critical position on EU matters. In addition, the strongly pro-EU stance of the general 
secretary of the TUC from 1993, John Monks – who left in 2003 to head the ETUC – 
has been qualified by a rather more pragmatic approach by his successor Brendan 
Barber. In 2004 Congress deferred a decision on the TCE, but rejected the Treaty the 
following year, seeing it as entrenching economic liberalisation. But by now the 
Constitution was effectively dead as a result of the French and Dutch votes, relieving 
the government of its promise to hold a referendum which would almost certainly 
have rejected the TCE.8 In 2007 Congress voted in favour of a referendum on Lisbon, 
largely as a protest against the UK opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights – 
although a motion to campaign for a 'no' vote was defeated. But the government 
rejected a referendum, on the unconvincing grounds that Lisbon was a completely 
different document from the TCE. 
Other governments followed the UK example. Writing of the French Maastricht 
referendum, Meunier-Aitsahalia and Ross (1993: 59) argued that ‘had rejection been 
the outcome, no future decision on monetary and political integration could have 
been taken without blatantly violating the democratically expressed will of the 
                                                        
8 Surveys showed ‘no’ majorities fluctuating between 2:1 and 3:1 (Baines and Gill 2006). 
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majority of French voters’. Such concerns did not deter the French government from 
proceeding with ratification without a new referendum. The position of the trade 
unions reflected their attitudes to the TCE: CFDT called for ‘adoption by parliament 
as rapidly as possible’; CGT demanded a new referendum; FO noted that its 
criticisms of the TCE still largely applied to Lisbon, but did not explicitly demand a 
referendum. In the Netherlands too, the Treaty was ratified by parliament with little 
public debate. The Swedish case was interesting, in that the ECJ Laval judgment was 
widely perceived as a direct threat to the traditional industrial relations system. The 
LO Congress in June 2008 rejected calls for a referendum but insisted that parliament 
should defer ratification until after legislative changes had been initiated which 
would protect the Swedish labour market from the effects of the Laval decision. In 
the event the Treaty was approved in November 2008 without the guarantees 
demanded by LO, with the support of the SAP despite strong internal opposition – 
but with a less overwhelming majority (mainly because of abstentions) than in other 
national parliaments. 
Overall, most countries saw demands for referendums on the Lisbon Treaty, mainly 
from the left, but mainstream trade unions did not endorse these calls. This may be 
seen as reflecting both the assessment that the Treaty was an improvement on the 
existing EU arrangements, and a fear that a referendum campaign – as well as being 
likely to result in rejection – would expose the internal divisions within the unions 
themselves. 
 
7. Conclusion: Are the Members out of Step? 
This survey of trade unions and EU referendums in western Europe reveals 
considerable cross-national diversity but also some common themes. Over recent 
decades, two conflicting trajectories have widely occurred. The first has been a shift 
in trade union attitudes towards European integration from suspicion or even 
antagonism towards acceptance and even enthusiasm (Busemeyer et al. 2008; Hyman 
2005). The ‘social dimension’ invented by Jacques Delors to provide a human face to 
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the completion of the single market helped turn those trade union movements which 
were potential opponents into reliable allies. In an important sense, union leaders 
have become professional Europeans, insiders in a process of integration but with 
their own agenda of moderating the neoliberal priorities which have come to 
dominate the EU. 
At the same time, the ‘permissive consensus’ involving popular acquiescence in the 
elite project of Europeanisation has been extensively shaken (Down and Wilson 2008; 
Hurrelman 2007; Norris 1997). The referendums in recent years have provided a 
radical shock to the political class, reinforced by the success in the 2009 EP elections 
in many countries of far-right anti-EU nationalist parties; but – as the rebranding of 
the TCE into the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates – the response has been to escape the 
consequences of popular rejection rather than to address its causes. 
Though the dynamics of each referendum campaign have been in important respects 
unique, four broad generalisations are possible. First, notwithstanding ‘second-order’ 
theories, in most cases the electorate seems to have been motivated more by 
European considerations than by those of national politics. Second, the popular 
verdict has tended to be a ‘reality check’ on the past evolution of European 
integration rather than an evaluation of the proposals supposedly on the agenda 
(Franklin et al. 1995: 102-4). Third, the UK situation in which the ‘eurosceptic’ agenda 
is shaped primarily from the political right is not typical of western Europe (though 
there are parallels in some of the new member states). Though hard-line Europhobia 
is almost exclusively a far-right phenomenon, in most of the campaigns discussed 
above the most prominent arguments have favoured a more social and more 
democratic Europe. Fourth, surveys have shown virtually without exception that 
manual (and to a lesser extent, routine white-collar) workers – the core constituency 
trade union membership – have been disproportionally represented within the ‘no’ 
camp. In this sense, the membership is clearly out of step with the policies of their 
unions. 
What is also clear is that public attitudes towards European integration are typically 
complex and contradictory. This means that they are politically malleable. Can trade 
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unions play a major role in shaping public opinion towards a progressive European 
politics, one which encourages ‘Euro-democratisation’ (Erne 1998) rather than 
comitology and stronger social protections in place of market liberalism? These are 
indeed objectives set out in the programmatic statements of the ETUC and its 
national affiliates. But having assented to the underlying architecture of actually 
existing Europeanisation, unions have rarely shown the will to mobilise offensively 
around an alternative vision of social Europe. Pressing for employee-friendly policies 
within the institutions of the EU, without a readiness to say ‘no’, has two damaging 
consequences. First, unions’ role within the policy-making process is collective 
begging, not collective bargaining. Second, it is left to other political forces to 
campaign uninhibitedly against the current bias of European integration as an elitist 
project which brings unemployment, labour market deregulation and the erosion of 
social protection. It requires a major strategic change for unions to offer an effective 
political antidote to the poison of ultra-nationalism and xenophobia. If they can 
achieve this, they might also be empowered to win greater progress towards the 
elusive ideal of ‘social Europe’. 
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